کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5078720 | 1477354 | 2009 | 9 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Experts vs. discounters: Consumer free-riding and experts withholding advice in markets for credence goods
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Experts vs. discounters: Consumer free-riding and experts withholding advice in markets for credence goods Experts vs. discounters: Consumer free-riding and experts withholding advice in markets for credence goods](/preview/png/5078720.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
This paper studies the incentives for credence goods experts to invest effort in diagnosis if effort is both costly and unobservable, and if they face competition by discounters who are not able to perform a diagnosis. The unobservability of diagnosis effort and the credence characteristic of the good induce experts to choose incentive compatible tariff structures. This makes them vulnerable to competition by discounters. We explore the conditions under which honestly diagnosing experts survive competition by discounters; we identify situations in which experts misdiagnose consumers in order to prevent them from free-riding on experts' advice; and we discuss policy options to solve the free-riding consumers-cheating experts problem.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: International Journal of Industrial Organization - Volume 27, Issue 1, January 2009, Pages 15-23
Journal: International Journal of Industrial Organization - Volume 27, Issue 1, January 2009, Pages 15-23
نویسندگان
Uwe Dulleck, Rudolf Kerschbamer,