کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5083825 | 1477822 | 2011 | 8 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Banks' risk race: A signaling explanation
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
Many observers argue that one of the major causes of the 2007-2009 recession was the abnormal accumulation of risk by banks. This paper provides a signaling explanation for this race for risk. If banks' returns can be observed while risk cannot, the less efficient banks can hide their type by taking more risks and paying the same returns as the more efficient banks. The latter can signal themselves by taking even higher risks and delivering bigger returns. The game presents several equilibria that are all characterized by excessive risk taking as compared to the perfect information case.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: International Review of Economics & Finance - Volume 20, Issue 4, October 2011, Pages 784-791
Journal: International Review of Economics & Finance - Volume 20, Issue 4, October 2011, Pages 784-791
نویسندگان
Damien Besancenot, Radu Vranceanu,