کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5084100 | 1477828 | 2010 | 16 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Communication in repeated monetary policy games
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
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چکیده انگلیسی
A central bank and the public are engaged in an infinitely repeated monetary policy game with communication. For reasonable discount factors, there exists an equilibrium in which the central bank fully reveals its private information. The fully revealing equilibrium is superior to the uninformative equilibrium. The welfare gain of transparency increases with the slope of the Phillips curve, the natural rate of unemployment, and the degree of heterogeneity in the population. Transparency results in lower inflation but a higher variability of inflation.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: International Review of Economics & Finance - Volume 19, Issue 2, April 2010, Pages 228-243
Journal: International Review of Economics & Finance - Volume 19, Issue 2, April 2010, Pages 228-243
نویسندگان
Nurlan Turdaliev,