کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5084316 1477838 2007 20 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Sustaining multilateral cooperation among asymmetric countries: Does MFN help?
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Sustaining multilateral cooperation among asymmetric countries: Does MFN help?
چکیده انگلیسی
The most favored nation (MFN) clause is widely understood to be the central pillar of the global multilateral trading system. Does the MFN principle of non-discrimination facilitate multilateral cooperation? Using a repeated game approach, we address this question in an oligopolistic three country model of intraindustry trade where production costs differ across countries. The analysis delivers two main results. First, both under MFN and tariff discrimination the incentive constraint of the high cost country determines whether or not free trade is sustainable. Second, the high cost country is more willing to cooperate multilaterally under MFN relative to tariff discrimination.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: International Review of Economics & Finance - Volume 16, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 543-562
نویسندگان
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