کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5084344 | 1477844 | 2006 | 10 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Lender's risk incentive and debt concession
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
This paper demonstrates that a lender's risk incentive may render it difficult to conduct efficient debt renegotiation. When a lending bank has a risk incentive, the bank is not likely to make a debt concession, even though such a concession could resolve inefficiencies caused by a borrower's risk incentive. If the lender refrains from renegotiation the debt, then the borrowing firm chooses a value-decreasing risky project. As a result, the cash flow that the lending bank collects becomes risky, and the wealth of the bank's shareholders increases. The lender's risk incentive thus accelerates the borrower's risk incentive.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: International Review of Economics & Finance - Volume 15, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 141-150
Journal: International Review of Economics & Finance - Volume 15, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 141-150
نویسندگان
Nobuyuki Isagawa,