کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5085730 | 1478075 | 2011 | 10 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Corrupt reciprocity - Experimental evidence on a men's game
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
Why are women regarded to be more resistant towards corruption? We address this question by letting students allotted the role of public servants receive a bribe and choose between reporting (whistleblowing), opportunism and reciprocity (delivery of a contract to the briber). Those acting as businesspersons choose whether or not to publicize at the end of the game. Male businesspersons more often depart from maximizing payoffs and allocate resources to punishing opportunistic public servants. Instead of acting opportunistically, some public servants tend to reciprocate or report. We find that female public servants are less inclined to reciprocate. Their resistance towards corruption is found to relate less to a willingness to report. Survey data from international households shows that men are more confident that bribes will be reciprocated, supporting our results.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: International Review of Law and Economics - Volume 31, Issue 2, June 2011, Pages 116-125
Journal: International Review of Law and Economics - Volume 31, Issue 2, June 2011, Pages 116-125
نویسندگان
Johann Graf Lambsdorff, Björn Frank,