کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5087949 | 1375466 | 2006 | 18 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
The paradox of limited deposit insurance under the amakudari practice in the Japanese banking system
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
Changing deposit insurance from full to limited in 2005 is expected to discipline Japanese banks' behaviour because depositors will start monitoring their banks. However, this discipline effect may be overturned due to the amakudari practice in the Japanese banking system where regulatory officials obtain post-retirement jobs in private banks. We consider a signalling game where depositors and banks have asymmetric information regarding banks' riskiness, and banks use amakudari officials to signal their riskiness. In order to create more post-retirement employment opportunities, the regulatory authority may weaken prudential regulation, which results in less discipline in the banking industry.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Asian Economics - Volume 17, Issue 1, February 2006, Pages 126-143
Journal: Journal of Asian Economics - Volume 17, Issue 1, February 2006, Pages 126-143
نویسندگان
Akihito Asano, Takaharu Eto,