کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5088095 1478295 2017 11 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Deposit competition and loan markets
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
رقابت سپرده ها و بازارهای وام
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
Less-intense competition for deposits, by mitigating banks' incentive to take excessive risks, is traditionally believed to lead to lower non-performing loan (NPL) ratios and more-stable banks. This paper revisits this proposition in a model with borrower moral hazard in which banks' NPL ratios depend endogenously on their loan pricing. In relatively uncompetitive loan markets, less-fierce competition for deposits (i.e., lower deposit rates) leads to lower loan rates and, thus, safer loans. In more-competitive markets, the opposite can occur: As banks' deposit-repayment burdens decline, they become less eager to risk-shift; this softens competition for risky loans, leading to higher loan rates and, ultimately, riskier loans. Overall, the model predicts a hump-shaped relationship between banks' pricing power in deposit markets and their NPL ratios.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Banking & Finance - Volume 80, July 2017, Pages 108-118
نویسندگان
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