کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5088095 | 1478295 | 2017 | 11 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Deposit competition and loan markets
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
رقابت سپرده ها و بازارهای وام
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
Less-intense competition for deposits, by mitigating banks' incentive to take excessive risks, is traditionally believed to lead to lower non-performing loan (NPL) ratios and more-stable banks. This paper revisits this proposition in a model with borrower moral hazard in which banks' NPL ratios depend endogenously on their loan pricing. In relatively uncompetitive loan markets, less-fierce competition for deposits (i.e., lower deposit rates) leads to lower loan rates and, thus, safer loans. In more-competitive markets, the opposite can occur: As banks' deposit-repayment burdens decline, they become less eager to risk-shift; this softens competition for risky loans, leading to higher loan rates and, ultimately, riskier loans. Overall, the model predicts a hump-shaped relationship between banks' pricing power in deposit markets and their NPL ratios.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Banking & Finance - Volume 80, July 2017, Pages 108-118
Journal: Journal of Banking & Finance - Volume 80, July 2017, Pages 108-118
نویسندگان
Stefan Arping,