کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5088638 | 1478320 | 2015 | 21 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Executive compensation and informed trading in acquiring firms around merger announcements
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
جبران اجرایی و آگاهی تجاری در کسب شرکت در اطراف اعلامیه ادغام
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
This paper analyzes informed trading in acquiring firms through (stock) merger announcements. We show that pre-announcement abnormal option volumes in acquiring firms strongly increase ahead of a stock merger (by approximately 300%). Furthermore, we show that the direction of option trades (puts or calls) prior to an announcement can predict post-announcement stock returns. Our results also indicate that higher wealth-to-performance sensitivities of top executives are related to higher abnormal put than call option trading before stock merger announcements. Overall, our results support the view that top executives have a hedging motive. They tend to purchase protection against, e.g., confounding (negative) information policies and/or empire-building mergers with negative NPVs, in order to avoid short-term salary losses (lower bonuses, lower stock options, etc.).
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Banking & Finance - Volume 55, June 2015, Pages 260-280
Journal: Journal of Banking & Finance - Volume 55, June 2015, Pages 260-280
نویسندگان
Umut Ordu, Denis Schweizer,