کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5090878 | 1375649 | 2008 | 12 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Share reacquisitions, surplus cash, and agency problems
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
Share repurchases help alleviate agency costs of surplus cash by restricting management's scope to waste corporate resources. But why do self-interested managers agree to disgorge surplus cash in the first place? This study examines the intervening effect of managerial monitoring and incentive alignment mechanisms on the decision to distribute excess cash through a share repurchase. Findings indicate that repurchases substitute for cash retention decisions that would otherwise prove costly for shareholders, and that better managerial incentive alignment and closer monitoring by external shareholders are important factors stimulating such payouts.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Banking & Finance - Volume 32, Issue 5, May 2008, Pages 795-806
Journal: Journal of Banking & Finance - Volume 32, Issue 5, May 2008, Pages 795-806
نویسندگان
Dennis Oswald, Steven Young,