کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5090917 | 1375651 | 2007 | 20 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Incentives and risk taking in hedge funds Incentives and risk taking in hedge funds](/preview/png/5090917.png)
We study how incentive fees and manager's own investment in the fund affect the investment strategy of hedge fund managers. We find that loss averse managers increase the risk of the fund's investment strategy with higher incentive fees. However, risk taking is greatly reduced if a substantial amount of the manager's own money (at least 30%) is in the fund. Using the Zurich hedge fund universe, we test the relation between risk taking and incentive fees empirically. Hedge funds with incentive fees have significantly lower mean returns (net of fees), while downside risk is positively related to the incentive fee level. Fund of funds charging large incentive fees achieve relatively high mean returns, but with significantly higher risk as well.
Journal: Journal of Banking & Finance - Volume 31, Issue 11, November 2007, Pages 3291-3310