کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5093089 1478433 2017 39 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Managerial myopia, financial expertise, and executive-firm matching
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
نزدیک بینی مدیریتی، تخصص مالی، و مطابق با اجرایی شرکت
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری کسب و کار و مدیریت بین المللی
چکیده انگلیسی
Existing literature emphasizes skills-based explanations for executive-firm matching, namely in the context of financial expertise. In contrast, our paper argues that informational concerns may also be relevant. We model a public firm with a project opportunity of uncertain quality, where long-run shareholders choose between hiring an operational manager or a financial expert. These managers are equally myopic, however financial experts are also privy to stock-market beliefs. Financial experts invest sub-optimally due to catering incentives, while operational managers tend to engage in signaling-driven overinvestment. We show that operational managers are preferred for low-NPV projects or when stock markets are well informed.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Corporate Finance - Volume 43, April 2017, Pages 464-479
نویسندگان
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