کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
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5093668 | 1478455 | 2013 | 20 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
This paper tests the effect of firms' mispricing and investment opportunities on the method of payment in mergers. Using a new proxy for investment opportunities and a sample of 1187 mergers completed between 1990 and 2005 among US publicly traded firms, I find that acquirers lead the decision on the method of payment, thus exploiting short-term market mispricing (in line with both the Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004 and Shleifer and Vishny, 2003 models). However, target managers believe in the quality of the merger and care about the long-term value of the merged entity's shares (as predicted by Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004 and contrary to Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). I also find that better investment opportunities lead to greater use of stock.
⺠Acquirers lead the decision on the payment method in mergers. ⺠They exploit the overpricing of their stocks choosing stock as method of payment. ⺠Target managers believe in the quality of the merger and overestimate the synergies. ⺠Higher investment opportunities lead to greater use of stock as method of payment. ⺠Acquirers exploit stock mispricing also in the equity issues around the mergers.
Journal: Journal of Corporate Finance - Volume 21, June 2013, Pages 196-215