کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5093799 | 1376144 | 2011 | 17 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Why are shareholders not paid to give up their voting privileges? Unique evidence from Italy
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری
کسب و کار و مدیریت بین المللی
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چکیده انگلیسی
⺠Prior literature has argued that unifying dual class shares is beneficial for voting shareholders. ⺠In Italy, exogenous changes in regulation made non-voting shares less useful to controlling shareholders, so the controlling voting shareholders unified their share classes. ⺠This is the forced conversion decision by the controlling shareholder and is mostly driven by macro-economic factors. ⺠During unification, a significant proportion of firms chose not to compensate voting shareholders for the loss of voting privileges. ⺠During this process, the minority voting shareholders suffered a wealth transfer to holders of non-voting shares. ⺠The compensation decision is driven mostly by ownership factors, specifically the ownership of non-voting shares by the controlling shareholder.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Corporate Finance - Volume 17, Issue 5, December 2011, Pages 1619-1635
Journal: Journal of Corporate Finance - Volume 17, Issue 5, December 2011, Pages 1619-1635
نویسندگان
Marco Bigelli, Vikas Mehrotra, P. Raghavendra Rau,