کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5093811 1376145 2010 11 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Do antitakeover provisions harm shareholders?
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری کسب و کار و مدیریت بین المللی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Do antitakeover provisions harm shareholders?
چکیده انگلیسی

We reexamine the negative relation between firm value and the number of antitakeover provisions a firm has in place. We document that firms with characteristics indicating low power to bargain for favorable terms in a takeover, but also indicating high potential agency costs, have more antitakeover provisions in place. We also find that for these firms, Tobin's Q increases in the number of adopted provisions. These findings are robust to several methods that control for endogeneity. Our evidence suggests that adopting more antitakeover provisions is beneficial for certain firms and challenges the commonplace view that antitakeover provisions are universally harmful for shareholders.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Corporate Finance - Volume 16, Issue 4, September 2010, Pages 487-497
نویسندگان
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