کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5093889 1376149 2011 24 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Managerial power theory, tournament theory, and executive pay in China
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری کسب و کار و مدیریت بین المللی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Managerial power theory, tournament theory, and executive pay in China
چکیده انگلیسی
In this paper, we test two models of executive pay that have not received much attention in research on Chinese listed companies: managerial power theory and tournament theory. We find that structural power (executive share ownership) and prestige power (executive education) are significantly positively related to executive remuneration, and political power (Executive/Party Secretary duality) positively and weakly related to executive remuneration. We also find that executive directors' organization level (as reflected in executive pay level for each of the three highest paid executives) is positively related to executive remuneration and the relationship is convex, and negatively related to the interaction between executive directors' organization level and government ownership. Tournament prize (executive pay) is not related to the number of contestants in the tournament and is negatively related to the interaction term between number of contestants and government ownership. Finally, earnings per share (EPS) as a measure of firm performance is positively related to the pay gap between contestants and negatively related to the interaction term between pay gap and government ownership. We explore the implications of these findings for reforming corporate governance in China.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Corporate Finance - Volume 17, Issue 4, September 2011, Pages 1176-1199
نویسندگان
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