کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5094021 1376159 2006 16 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Signaling in the Internet craze of initial public offerings
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری کسب و کار و مدیریت بین المللی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Signaling in the Internet craze of initial public offerings
چکیده انگلیسی
We explain the clustering of underpricing in initial public offerings (IPOs). The model features an industry with aggregate demand uncertainty and asymmetric information about firms' quality. In the IPO market, firms can signal quality by underpricing or under-issuing new shares. Expected aggregate demand for the industry's products increases with the publicity that the industry creates through IPO underpricing. We show that asymmetric information and expectations on aggregate product demand interact with each other to generate multiple equilibria. Underpriced IPOs cluster in one equilibrium but not in the other. We use these results to explain why the clustering often occurs in particular industries, is short-lived, and is sensitive to economic conditions.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Corporate Finance - Volume 12, Issue 4, September 2006, Pages 818-833
نویسندگان
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