کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5094054 1376162 2008 17 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Protective governance choices and the value of acquisition activity
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری کسب و کار و مدیریت بین المللی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Protective governance choices and the value of acquisition activity
چکیده انگلیسی
Protective governance structure is often viewed as costly to minority shareholders who bear the costs of opportunism by entrenched managers. A less common view is that protective governance encourages value-enhancing initiative, allowing risk-averse managers to pursue projects they would otherwise forgo. To assess these views we examine the acquisition decisions of S&P 500 firms between 1994 and 2005 and document two entrenching dimensions of governance: founding family presence and larger boards with more inside directors. We find that family firms destroy value when they acquire, consistent with an agency cost explanation for acquisitions. In contrast, firms with large boards and more insiders are more likely to acquire and to create value when they do acquire. These results are consistent with benefits to managerial initiative when managers are insulated from discipline. Finally, we find no systematic evidence that shareholder right limiting provisions either facilitate managerial entrenchment or lead to wealth losses through acquisition activity.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Corporate Finance - Volume 14, Issue 5, December 2008, Pages 550-566
نویسندگان
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