کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5094065 1376162 2008 17 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Multiple large shareholders, control contests, and implied cost of equity
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری کسب و کار و مدیریت بین المللی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Multiple large shareholders, control contests, and implied cost of equity
چکیده انگلیسی

In this paper, we examine whether the presence of multiple large shareholders alleviates a firm's agency costs and information asymmetry manifested in the cost of equity financing. Using data for 1165 corporations from 8 East Asian and 13 Western European countries, we find evidence that the implied cost of equity decreases with the presence, number, and voting size of large shareholders beyond the controlling owner. We also find that the identity of the second largest shareholder is important in determining the risk of corporate expropriation in family-controlled firms. Our regional analysis reveals that, mainly in East Asian firms, multiple large shareholders structures exert an internal governance role in curbing private benefits and reducing information asymmetry, perhaps to sidestep deficiencies in the external institutional environment.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Corporate Finance - Volume 14, Issue 5, December 2008, Pages 721-737
نویسندگان
, , ,