کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5094186 | 1376173 | 2006 | 26 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
The price of power: Valuing the controlling position of owner-managers in French IPO firms
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری
کسب و کار و مدیریت بین المللی
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چکیده انگلیسی
Going public often creates an agency conflict between the owner-manager and minority shareholders. This problem is especially severe in countries with poor legal investor protection, such as France. We examine the controlling position of owner-managers in French initial public offering (IPO) firms. We find that investors anticipate the increased agency conflict associated with a lock on control and lower firm value when the owner-manager is more powerful. Shareholder agreements in which the owner-manager agrees to share control with other pre-IPO owners enhance firm value. We also report that higher cash flow ownership by the owner-manager is positively related to firm value when he is not in full control. Finally, we document that the large (non-pecuniary) private benefits of control in France may motivate owner-managers to retain control after the IPO.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Corporate Finance - Volume 12, Issue 2, January 2006, Pages 270-295
Journal: Journal of Corporate Finance - Volume 12, Issue 2, January 2006, Pages 270-295
نویسندگان
Peter Roosenboom, Willem Schramade,