کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5095091 | 1376268 | 2009 | 10 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Incentives, supervision, and sharecropper productivity
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
Though sharecropping remains widespread, its determinants are still poorly understood and the debate over the extent of moral hazard is far from settled. We address both issues by analyzing the role of landlord supervision. When landlords vary in their cost of supervision, otherwise identical share-tenants can have different productivity. Unique data on monitoring frequency collected from share-tenants in rural Pakistan confirms that, controlling for selection, 'supervised' tenants are significantly more productive than 'unsupervised' ones. Also, landlords' decisions regarding monitoring and incentives offered to tenants depend importantly on the cost of supervision.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Development Economics - Volume 88, Issue 2, March 2009, Pages 232-241
Journal: Journal of Development Economics - Volume 88, Issue 2, March 2009, Pages 232-241
نویسندگان
Hanan G. Jacoby, Ghazala Mansuri,