کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5095312 | 1376281 | 2007 | 22 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Bribery, inefficiency, and bureaucratic delay
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
We examine bribery in a dynamic setting with a partially honest bureaucracy. The presence of honest officials lowers the bribe that a corrupt official can extract from efficient applicants. Consequently, efficient applicants may face delays in receiving licenses, or may never receive licenses, as inefficient applicants are serviced ahead of them. An increase in the proportion of honest officials, while directly increasing the incidence of socially optimal decisions, can also induce greater inefficiencies (misallocation and delay) from corrupt officials. As a result, social welfare may be non-monotonic in the proportion of honest officials, and small differences in monitoring costs may lead to very different levels of corruption. Competition between officials can hurt efficiency; its desirability depends on the prevalence of applicants' ability to pay bribes.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Development Economics - Volume 84, Issue 1, September 2007, Pages 465-486
Journal: Journal of Development Economics - Volume 84, Issue 1, September 2007, Pages 465-486
نویسندگان
Christian Ahlin, Pinaki Bose,