کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5098307 1478692 2015 9 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Imitation by price and quantity setting firms in a differentiated market
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
تقلید از طریق قیمت و تعداد شرکت های تعیین شده در یک بازار متمایز
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه ریاضیات کنترل و بهینه سازی
چکیده انگلیسی
We study the evolution of imitation behaviour in a differentiated market where firms are located equidistantly on a (Salop) circle. Firms choose price and quantity simultaneously, leaving open the possibility for non-market-clearing outcomes. The strategy of the most successful firm is imitated. Behaviour in the stochastically stable outcome depends on the level of market differentiation and corresponds exactly with the Nash equilibrium outcome of the underlying stage game. For high level of differentiation, firms end up at the monopoly outcome. For intermediate level of differentiation, they gravitate to a “mutually non-aggressive” outcome where price is higher than the monopoly price. For low level of differentiation, firms price at a mark-up above the marginal cost. Market-clearing always results endogenously.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control - Volume 53, April 2015, Pages 28-36
نویسندگان
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