کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5098578 | 1478701 | 2014 | 34 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Imperfect credibility and robust monetary policy
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
اعتبار نامناسب و سیاست پولی قوی
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موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه
ریاضیات
کنترل و بهینه سازی
چکیده انگلیسی
This paper studies the behavior of a central bank that seeks to conduct policy optimally while having imperfect credibility and harboring doubts about its model. Taking the Smets-Wouters model as the central bank׳s approximating model, the paper׳s main findings are as follows. First, a central bank׳s credibility can have large consequences for how policy responds to shocks. Second, central banks that have low credibility can benefit from a desire for robustness because this desire motivates the central bank to follow through on policy announcements that would otherwise not be time-consistent. Third, even relatively small departures from perfect credibility can produce important declines in policy performance. Fourth, the risk premium shock represents an important potential source of model misspecification. Finally, as a technical contribution, the paper develops a numerical procedure to solve the decision-problem facing an imperfectly credible policymaker that seeks robustness.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control - Volume 44, July 2014, Pages 218-234
Journal: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control - Volume 44, July 2014, Pages 218-234
نویسندگان
Richard Dennis,