کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5099028 | 1376979 | 2009 | 12 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Stochastic adaptation in finite games played by heterogeneous populations
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه
ریاضیات
کنترل و بهینه سازی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
چکیده انگلیسی
We analyze stochastic adaptation in finite n-player games played by heterogeneous populations containing best repliers, better repliers, and imitators. Individuals select strategies by applying a personal learning rule to a sample from a finite history of past play. We give sufficient conditions for convergence to minimal closed sets under better replies and selection of a Pareto dominant such set. Finally, we demonstrate that the stochastically stable states are sensitive to the sample size by showing convergence to the risk-dominant equilibrium for sufficiently small sample size and to the Pareto-dominant equilibrium for sufficiently large sample size in 2Ã2 coordination games.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control - Volume 33, Issue 8, August 2009, Pages 1543-1554
Journal: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control - Volume 33, Issue 8, August 2009, Pages 1543-1554
نویسندگان
Jens Josephson,