کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5099172 1376990 2009 17 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Matching with interviews
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه ریاضیات کنترل و بهینه سازی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Matching with interviews
چکیده انگلیسی
This paper explores how interviews affect the matching process when worker productivity is private information. Wages are determined by a single round of strategic bargaining after the worker is interviewed. The implications of this hiring process for the efficiency of matching and the incidence and severity of statistical discrimination are considered. The better are firms at identifying productive workers the worse the average quality of the unemployment pool so interviewing tends to slow down matching for every one. Multiple Pareto rankable equilibria are possible such that any social group in a “bad” equilibrium faces stricter hiring standards, longer spells of unemployment and lower welfare.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control - Volume 33, Issue 4, April 2009, Pages 938-954
نویسندگان
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