کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5099486 | 1377010 | 2010 | 13 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
An adverse selection model of optimal unemployment insurance
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه
ریاضیات
کنترل و بهینه سازی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
چکیده انگلیسی
We ask whether offering a menu of unemployment insurance contracts is welfare-improving in a heterogeneous population. We adopt a repeated moral hazard framework as in Shavell and Weiss (1979), supplemented by unobserved heterogeneity about agents' job opportunities. Our main theoretical contribution is a quasi-recursive formulation of our adverse selection problem, including a geometric characterization of the state space. Our main economic result is that optimal contracts for “bad” searchers tend to be upward-sloping due to an adverse selection effect. This is in contrast to the well-known optimal decreasing time profile of benefits in pure moral hazard environments that continue to be optimal for “good” searchers in our model.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control - Volume 34, Issue 3, March 2010, Pages 490-502
Journal: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control - Volume 34, Issue 3, March 2010, Pages 490-502
نویسندگان
Marcus Hagedorn, Ashok Kaul, Tim Mennel,