کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5099501 | 1377011 | 2011 | 12 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Buying cooperation in an asymmetric environmental differential game
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه
ریاضیات
کنترل و بهینه سازی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
چکیده انگلیسی
We consider a two-player asymmetric differential game of pollution control. One player is non-vulnerable to pollution, or unwilling to consider damages when choosing her production policy in a non-cooperative game. We characterize the feedback-Nash equilibrium and the cooperative solution. We establish conditions under which the vulnerable player can buy the cooperation of the non-vulnerable player to control her emissions. We further use the Nash bargaining solution to allocate the total cooperative dividend between the two players and propose a time-consistent decomposition overtime of the total payoff.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control - Volume 35, Issue 6, June 2011, Pages 935-946
Journal: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control - Volume 35, Issue 6, June 2011, Pages 935-946
نویسندگان
Pascaux Smala Fanokoa, Issam Telahigue, Georges Zaccour,