کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5099725 | 1377025 | 2006 | 26 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Stock grants as a commitment device
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه
ریاضیات
کنترل و بهینه سازی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
چکیده انگلیسی
A large and increasing fraction of the value of executives' compensation is accounted for by security grants. However, in most models of executive compensation, the optimal allocation can be implemented through a sequence of state-contingent cash payments. Security awards are redundant. In this paper we develop a dynamic model of managerial compensation where neither the firm nor the manager can commit to long-term contracts. We show that, in this environment, if stock grants are not used, then the optimal contract collapses to a series of short term contracts. When stock grants are used, however, nonlinear intertemporal schemes can be implemented to achieve better risk-sharing and higher firm value.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control - Volume 30, Issue 11, November 2006, Pages 2191-2216
Journal: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control - Volume 30, Issue 11, November 2006, Pages 2191-2216
نویسندگان
Gian Luca Clementi, Thomas F. Cooley, Cheng Wang,