کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5100064 | 1478734 | 2017 | 50 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Conjugate information disclosure in an auction with learning
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
افشای اطلاعات مرتبط در حراج با یادگیری
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
We consider a single-item, independent private value auction environment with two bidders: a leader, who knows his valuation, and a follower, who privately chooses how much to learn about his valuation. We show that, under some conditions, an ex-post efficient revenue-maximizing auction-which solicits bids sequentially-partially discloses the leader's bid to the follower, to influence his learning. The disclosure rule that emerges is novel; it may reveal to the follower only a pair of bids to which the leader's actual bid belongs. The identified disclosure rule, relative to the first-best, induces the follower to learn less when the leader's valuation is low and more when the leader's valuation is high.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 171, September 2017, Pages 174-212
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 171, September 2017, Pages 174-212
نویسندگان
Arina Nikandrova, Romans Pancs,