کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5100073 | 1478735 | 2017 | 14 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
On public good provision mechanisms with dominant strategies and balanced budget
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
در مکانیسم های ارائه عمومی خوب با استراتژی های غالب و بودجه متعادل
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
Consider a mechanism for the binary public good provision problem that is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC), ex-post individually rational (EPIR), and ex-post budget balanced (EPBB). It is well known that if there are only two agents, then any such mechanism must have a threshold (or fixed cost-sharing) form, providing the public good if and only if both agents have values that are at least their respective thresholds. When there are more than two agents, there are mechanisms that are DSIC, EPIR, and EPBB that are not of the threshold form. Any DSIC, EPIR, and EPBB mechanism that additionally satisfies that the lowest types expect zero net utility from participating are again of the threshold form. This additional condition arises endogenously when maximizing expected welfare subject to DSIC, EPIR, and EPBB.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 170, July 2017, Pages 56-69
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 170, July 2017, Pages 56-69
نویسندگان
Christoph Kuzmics, Jan-Henrik Steg,