کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5100093 | 1478736 | 2017 | 12 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Temporary boycotts as self-fulfilling disruptions of markets
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
تحریم موقت به عنوان اختلال خود در تحقق بازارهای
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
This paper demonstrates how equilibrium involving anticipated boycotts and actual boycotts can occur, even though consumers are negligible and only care about the price they pay and the timing of purchase. The model is a two-period durable goods monopoly game with demand uncertainty. First, a “non-boycott” equilibrium is characterized. Under regularity assumptions ruling out multiplicative uncertainty, there are additional equilibria in which the firm sets a low price in period 0, based on the anticipation that consumers will boycott whenever the price exceeds a threshold. Also, the augmented game, with a publicly observed sunspot, has equilibria in which boycotts occur on the equilibrium path with positive probability.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 169, May 2017, Pages 1-12
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 169, May 2017, Pages 1-12
نویسندگان
James Peck,