کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5100904 | 1479076 | 2017 | 48 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Self-enforcing trade agreements and lobbying
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
موافقت نامه های تجاری خودمختاری و لابی
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
In an environment where international trade agreements must be enforced via promises of future cooperation, the presence of an import-competing lobby has important implications for optimal punishments. When lobbies work to disrupt trade agreements, a Nash reversion punishment scheme must balance two conflicting objectives. Longer punishments help to enforce cooperation by increasing the government's costs of defecting, but, because the lobby prefers the punishment outcome, this also incentivizes lobbying effort and with it political pressure to break the agreement. Thus the model generates an optimal length for Nash reversion punishments, and it depends directly on the political influence of the lobbies. Trade agreement tariffs are shown to be increasing in the political influence of the lobbies, as well as their patience levels.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of International Economics - Volume 108, September 2017, Pages 226-242
Journal: Journal of International Economics - Volume 108, September 2017, Pages 226-242
نویسندگان
Kristy Buzard,