کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5101445 | 1479252 | 2017 | 15 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Endogenous information revelation in a competitive credit market and credit crunch
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
افشای اطلاعات درونی در یک بازار رقابتی اعتباری و بحران اعتباری
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کلمات کلیدی
بحران اعتباری، افشای اطلاعات درونی،
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه
ریاضیات
ریاضیات کاربردی
چکیده انگلیسی
In this paper, we propose a new mechanism able to explain the occurrence of credit crunches. Considering a credit market with an asymmetry of information between borrowers and lenders, we assume that borrowers have to pay a cost to reveal information on the quality of their project. They decide to be transparent if it is necessary for getting a loan or for paying a lower interest rate. Two types of competitive equilibria may exist: an opaque equilibrium in which all projects receive funding without revealing information; a transparent one in which only the best projects reveal information and receive funding. It is also possible to get multiple equilibria. Incorporating this microeconomic mechanism in an OLG model, the economy may experience fluctuations due to the change of regime, and indeterminacy may occur.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics - Volume 68, January 2017, Pages 127-141
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics - Volume 68, January 2017, Pages 127-141
نویسندگان
Yuanyuan Li, Bertrand Wigniolle,