کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5102529 | 1480085 | 2017 | 12 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Stability, fairness and random walks in the bargaining problem
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
ثبات، عدالت و پیروزی های تصادفی در مسئله چانه زنی
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه
ریاضیات
فیزیک ریاضی
چکیده انگلیسی
We study the classical bargaining problem and its two canonical solutions, (Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky), from a novel point of view: we ask for stability of the solution if both players are able distort the underlying bargaining process by reference to a third party (e.g. a court). By exploring the simplest case, where decisions of the third party are made randomly we obtain a stable solution, where players do not have any incentive to refer to such a third party. While neither the Nash nor the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution are able to ensure stability in case reference to a third party is possible, we found that the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution seems to always dominate the stable allocation which constitutes novel support in favor of the latter.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications - Volume 488, 15 December 2017, Pages 60-71
Journal: Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications - Volume 488, 15 December 2017, Pages 60-71
نویسندگان
Jakob Kapeller, Stefan Steinerberger,