Cognitive vision: The case for embodied perception

This paper considers arguments for the necessity of embodiment in cognitive vision systems. We begin by delineating the scope of cognitive vision, and follow this by a survey of the various approaches that can be taken to the realization of artificial cognitive vision systems, focussing on cognitive aspects. These range from the cognitivist symbolic representational paradigm, through connectionist systems and self-organizing dynamical systems, to the enactive cognition paradigm. We then consider various arguments for embodiment, beginning with paradigm-specific cases, and concluding with a paradigm-independent argument for embodied perception and cognition. We explore briefly different forms of embodiment and their relevance to the foregoing viewpoints. We highlight some of the key problems associated with embodied cognitive vision, including the phylogeny/ontogeny trade-off in artificial systems and the developmental limitations imposed by real-time environmental coupling. Finally, we conclude by considering some aspects of natural cognitive systems to see how they can provide insights to help in addressing these problems.