کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
6368793 | 1623798 | 2017 | 22 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Combination with anti-tit-for-tat remedies problems of tit-for-tat
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
ترکیب با داروهای ضد تاتی برای تات مشکلات از دست دادن
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کلمات کلیدی
تکامل همکاری، معضل زندانی، متقابل، حافظه،
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم زیستی و بیوفناوری
علوم کشاورزی و بیولوژیک
علوم کشاورزی و بیولوژیک (عمومی)
چکیده انگلیسی
One of the most important questions in game theory concerns how mutual cooperation can be achieved and maintained in a social dilemma. In Axelrod's tournaments of the iterated prisoner's dilemma, Tit-for-Tat (TFT) demonstrated the role of reciprocity in the emergence of cooperation. However, the stability of TFT does not hold in the presence of implementation error, and a TFT population is prone to neutral drift to unconditional cooperation, which eventually invites defectors. We argue that a combination of TFT and anti-TFT (ATFT) overcomes these difficulties in a noisy environment, provided that ATFT is defined as choosing the opposite to the opponent's last move. According to this TFT-ATFT strategy, a player normally uses TFT; turns to ATFT upon recognizing his or her own error; returns to TFT either when mutual cooperation is recovered or when the opponent unilaterally defects twice in a row. The proposed strategy provides simple and deterministic behavioral rules for correcting implementation error in a way that cannot be exploited by the opponent, and suppresses the neutral drift to unconditional cooperation.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Theoretical Biology - Volume 412, 7 January 2017, Pages 1-7
Journal: Journal of Theoretical Biology - Volume 412, 7 January 2017, Pages 1-7
نویسندگان
Su Do Yi, Seung Ki Baek, Jung-Kyoo Choi,