Effects of long-term contracts on firms exercising market power in transmission constrained electricity markets

The electricity markets with only few large firms are often vulnerable to less competitive behaviors than the desired. The presence of transmission constraints further restrict the competition among firms and provide more opportunities for firms to exercise market power. While it is generally acknowledged that the long-term contracts provide good measures for mitigating market power in the spot market (thus reducing undesired price spikes), it is not even more clear how effective these contracts are if the market is severely limited due to transmission constraints. In this paper, an analytical approach through finding a Nash equilibrium is presented to investigate the effects of long-term contracts on firms exercising market power in a bid-based pool with transmission constraints. Surprisingly the analysis in this paper shows that the presence of long-term contracts may result in the reduced expected social welfare. A straightforward consequence of the analysis presented in this paper will be helpful for the regulators in Korea to reconsider offering vesting contracts to generating companies in the near future.