Research on the complex features about a dual-channel supply chain with a fair caring retailer

This paper considers two different pricing policies in a dual-channel supply chain with a fair caring retailer. We establish two models: a Stackelberg game model in which the manufacturer acts as the leader and the retailer acts as the follower. The other one is a vertical Nash game model where the two firms have equal bargaining power and thus make decisions simultaneously. The models have demonstrated those dynamic behaviors, such as the bifurcation, periodic cycles and strange attractors of the systems. The influences of the fair concern coefficient and decision parameters on the complex nonlinear dynamics behaviors of the two models are analyzed through numerical simulation. The results show that in Stackelberg game model, the higher adjustment speed of the wholesale or the directly price is disadvantageous to manufacturer, but it is beneficial to retailer. In addition, in two game models, the excessive fairness concern is not always benefit to the retailer, it can also reduce the retailer's profit. With the increase in the retailer's fair concern coefficient, the total profits in two models both decrease while the total profits gap between two models gets better.