Noncognitive proponents' conflation of “cognitive skills” and “cognition” and its implications

Noncognitive skills have drawn the interest of psychologists, educators, economists and policymakers over the past 30 years. Despite dissatisfaction with the label “noncognitive skills” that term is still commonly used to describe the construct domain. One reason cited for objecting to the label “noncognitive” is that it implies that the constructs and measures do not entail cognition, a virtual impossibility. I argue this seemingly innocent conflation of “cognition” and “cognitive skills” unknowingly glosses over a fundamental divide in how the subject of psychology is conceptualized and psychological research conducted: The differential and experimental traditions. Where “cognitive skills” originate in the differential tradition and are usually treated as synonymous with psychometric intelligence, “cognition” originates in the experimental tradition and encompasses seemingly all human mental activity. While cognitive skills constitute a variety of cognition not all cognition entails the higher-order, complex mental activity that defines cognitive skills. This seemingly minor conflation suggests that many working in the noncognitive domain do not possess a strong understanding of what cognitive skills are. I provide additional evidence for this assertion and discuss the potentially serious practical consequences of creating and using noncognitive skills assessments without possessing a thorough understanding of cognitive skills.