Novel pricing model for spectrum leasing in secondary spectrum market

According to the property rights model of cognitive radio, primary users who own the spectral resource have the right to lease or trade part of it to secondary users in exchange for appropriate profit. In this paper, an implementation of this framework is investigated, where a primary link can lease the owned spectrum to secondary nodes in exchange for cooperation (relaying). A novel pricing model is proposed that enables the trading between spectrum and cooperation. Based on the demand of secondary nodes, the primary link attempts to maximize its quality of service (QoS) by setting the price of spectrum. Taking the price asked by primary link, the secondary nodes aim to obtain most profits by deciding the amount of spectrum to buy and then pay for it by cooperative transmission. The investigated model is conveniently cast in the framework of seller/buyer (Stackelberg) games. Analysis and numerical results show that our pricing model is effective and practical for spectrum leasing based on trading spectral resource for cooperation.