کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
7352844 1477050 2018 17 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
A study of the nucleolus in the nested cost-sharing problem: Axiomatic and strategic perspectives
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
بررسی هسته ای در مسئله به اشتراک گذاری هزینه های توجیه شده: دیدگاه های استراتژیک و استراتژیک
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
We investigate the nucleolus from both axiomatic and strategic perspectives in the nested cost-sharing problem in which the cost of a public facility has to be shared among agents having different needs for it. We adopt a Right-endpoint Subtraction (RS) formulation, which underlies these two properties: RS bilateral consistency and RS converse consistency. As we show, the nucleolus is the only RS bilaterally consistent (or RS conversely consistent) rule satisfying equal treatment of equals and last-agent cost additivity. In addition, we introduce a game exploiting the two properties to strategically justify the nucleolus. Our results, together with the axiomatization and strategic justification of the Constrained Equal Benefits (CEB) rule in Hu et al. (2012), show that adopting different formulations to define a reduced problem leads to axiomatizing and, in particular, strategically justifying the CEB rule and the nucleolus in the nested cost-sharing problem.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 109, May 2018, Pages 82-98
نویسندگان
, , ,