کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
7356647 | 1478287 | 2018 | 16 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Bank monitoring and CEO risk-taking incentives
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
نظارت بر بانک ها و انگیزه های ریسک پذیری مدیر عامل شرکت
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
This paper investigates whether monitoring by bank lenders affects CEO incentives of borrowing firms. We find that an increase in bank monitoring incentives significantly reduce the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock return volatility (Vega). The results are more profound when bank lenders are more powerful and reputable and have a prior lending relationship with the borrowing firms. Additionally, Vega decreases after financial covenant violations and increases when bank lenders have offsetting equity stakes in borrowing firms. The reduction in Vega due to bank monitoring has some real effects on borrowing firms' corporate policies. These results together suggest banks have a unique role in monitoring and shaping CEO incentives to mitigate the risk-shifting incentives of firm managers.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Banking & Finance - Volume 88, March 2018, Pages 225-240
Journal: Journal of Banking & Finance - Volume 88, March 2018, Pages 225-240
نویسندگان
Anthony Saunders, Keke Song,