کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
7359155 | 1478730 | 2018 | 30 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Bounding payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring: n-player games
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
We provide a simple upper bound on the Nash equilibrium payoff set at a fixed discount factor in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. The bound admits a tractable recursive characterization and can thus be applied “off-the-shelf” to any repeated game. The bound is not tight in general, but it is tight if the stage game is “concave” or if a certain form of observable mixed actions is allowed. We illustrate our results with applications to the repeated prisoners' dilemma and to canonical public goods and oligopoly games.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 175, May 2018, Pages 58-87
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 175, May 2018, Pages 58-87
نویسندگان
Takuo Sugaya, Alexander Wolitzky,