کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
7359803 | 1478747 | 2015 | 46 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Bounding the inefficiency of outcomes in generalized second price auctions
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
محدود کردن ناکارآمدی نتایج در مزایده های دوم قیمت عمومی
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
We present a constant bound (2.927) on the factor of the efficiency loss (price of anarchy) of the corresponding game for the Bayesian model of partial information about other participants and about ad quality factors. For the full information setting, we prove a surprisingly low upper bound of 1.282 on the price of anarchy over pure Nash equilibria, nearly matching a lower bound of 1.259 for the case of three advertisers. Further, we do not require that the system reaches equilibrium, and give similarly low bounds also on the quality degradation for any no-regret learning outcome. Our conclusion is that the number of advertisers in the auction has almost no impact on the price of anarchy, and that the efficiency of GSP is very robust with respect to the belief and rationality assumptions imposed on the participants.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 156, March 2015, Pages 343-388
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 156, March 2015, Pages 343-388
نویسندگان
Ioannis Caragiannis, Christos Kaklamanis, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Maria Kyropoulou, Brendan Lucier, Renato Paes Leme, Ãva Tardos,