کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
7359848 | 1478751 | 2014 | 23 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Constrained interactions and social coordination
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
تعاملات محدود و هماهنگی اجتماعی
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
We consider a co-evolutionary model of social coordination and network formation where agents may decide on an action in a 2Ã2-coordination game and on whom to establish costly links to. We find that if agents may only support a limited number of links payoff dominant conventions will emerge in the long run, contrasting the case of unconstrained interactions where risk dominant conventions arise for a wide range of parameters. Under constrained iterations, already a small number of agents choosing the payoff dominant action enables agents - by linking up to those agents and choosing the payoff dominant action - to secure themselves the highest possible payoff. We extend our model by discussing constrained interactions in the context of general mÃm games, convex payoff functions, heterogeneous constraints, and frictions in link formation.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 152, July 2014, Pages 41-63
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 152, July 2014, Pages 41-63
نویسندگان
Mathias Staudigl, Simon Weidenholzer,