کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
7361759 | 1478893 | 2018 | 40 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Managerial myopia and the mortgage meltdown
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
نزدیک بینی مدیریتی و سقوط وام مسکن
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری
حسابداری
چکیده انگلیسی
Prominent policy makers assert that managerial short-termism was at the root of the subprime crisis of 2007-2009. Prior scholarly research, however, largely rejects this assertion. Using a more comprehensive measure of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) incentives for short-termism, we uncover evidence that short-termism indeed played a role. Firms whose CEOs were contractually allowed to sell or exercise more of their stock and options holdings sooner had more subprime exposure, a higher probability of financial distress, and lower risk-adjusted stock returns during the crisis, as well as higher fines and settlements for subprime-related fraud.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics - Volume 128, Issue 3, June 2018, Pages 466-485
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics - Volume 128, Issue 3, June 2018, Pages 466-485
نویسندگان
Adam C. Kolasinski, Nan Yang,