کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
7364113 1479085 2016 46 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
External trade diversion, exclusion incentives and the nature of preferential trade agreements
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
انحراف تجارت خارجی، انگیزه های محرومیت و ماهیت توافقنامه های تجارت ترجیحی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
In a game of endogenous trade agreements between three countries, we show that while the pursuit of customs unions (CUs) prevents global free trade from emerging as a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, the pursuit of free trade agreements (FTAs) does not. This result reflects the relatively flexible nature of FTAs: whereas each FTA member can independently undertake further trade liberalization with respect to the non-member, CU members must do so as a group due to their common external tariff. By diverting members' exports away from the non-member, both types of trade agreements induce the non-member to voluntarily lower its import tariffs.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of International Economics - Volume 99, March 2016, Pages 105-119
نویسندگان
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