کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
7367557 | 1479247 | 2017 | 30 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Impossibilities for strategy-proof committee selection mechanisms with vetoers
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه
ریاضیات
ریاضیات کاربردی
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چکیده انگلیسی
When a group of voters selects a committee out of a set of candidates, it is common and often desirable to endow these voters with some veto power. I present impossibility results showing that even limited veto power makes many mechanisms of interest manipulable. This applies in particular (i) to mechanisms the range of which contains a degenerate lottery in which a committee is chosen for sure and (ii) to mechanisms that are constructed from extensive game forms with a finite number of strategies. These impossibilities hold on a large set of domains including the domain of additive preferences, and even when probabilistic mechanisms are allowed and voters can report cardinal preferences.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics - Volume 73, December 2017, Pages 111-121
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Economics - Volume 73, December 2017, Pages 111-121
نویسندگان
Martin Van der Linden,