کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
7370168 | 1479437 | 2014 | 13 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Extortion and political-risk insurance
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
اخاذی و بیمه در معرض خطر سیاسی
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
We consider the problem faced by firms operating in a foreign country characterized by weak governance. Our focus is on extortion based on the threat of expropriation and bureaucratic harassment. The bureaucrat's bargaining power is characterized by a general extortion mechanism adapted from the optimal auction theory in Myerson (1981). This characterization is used to analyze the determinants of the quality of governance and whether and how this is improved by political-risk insurance. This insurance reduces the bureaucrat's total revenue from corruption, but may also increase the risk of expropriation and extortion bribes. The analysis allows us to derive some policy recommendations with respect to public intervention in the political-risk insurance sector.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Public Economics - Volume 120, December 2014, Pages 144-156
Journal: Journal of Public Economics - Volume 120, December 2014, Pages 144-156
نویسندگان
Frédéric Koessler, Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky,